was no good doing so unless the French did the same. Otherwise, the German would bring his best men and guns and all his ammunition against the British Army and then later against the French. Tentative and feeble attacks were really more costly in the end.

M. Painleve said that the French Government were in complete agreement with my opinions, but thought the idea, which had grown since the last *French policy* offensive, that France now contemplated *defined* a passive offensive in order to save lives, should be put right. What the French Government really intended was to adopt the best method for using the full effect of the French resources and sacrifices with the minimum of loss, and he thought that the opinion of the Conference was unanimous to continue to do the enemy the greatest possible amount of damage. The discussion ended by a mutual assurance of complete confidence in the British and French intentions to use their full strength. General Petain adhered firmly to his policy of "limited" offensives. The strategy of the rupture which was the idea of the Champagne, Somme, Chemin des Dames and afterwards of the Flanders offensive, was thus definitely thrown over in favour of the policy of limited offensives with a definite objective, which was subsequently practised with such success by General Petain at Moronvilliers and Verdun.

It will be noted that Sir William Robertson, at the Conference and after, accepted unreservedly the Petain policy of "making the fullest use of our artillery"—that meant the Petain *defensive tactics* scheme of saving your own men and wasting the enemy by heavy bombardment. The C.I.G.S. stated categorically that "it is